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Abstract - Windows XP is the dominant operating system in the 
world today and rootkits have been a major concern for XP 
users. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the rootkits 
that target that operating system, while focusing on those that 
use various hooking techniques to hide malware on a machine. 
We identify some of the weaknesses in the Windows XP 
architecture that rootkits exploit and then evaluate some of the 
anti-rootkit security features that Microsoft has unveiled in 
Vista and 7. To reduce the number of rootkit infections in the 
future, we suggest that Microsoft should take full advantage of 
Intel’s four distinct privilege levels.  
Keywords – computer security; malicious software 
(malware); rootkits; Microsoft Windows; Intel’s ring architecture  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rootkits refer to software that is used to hide the 
presence and activity of viruses, worms, Trojans and other 
forms of malware, and permit an attacker to take control of a 
computer system [21]. Installing a rootkit is usually the first 
thing that an attacker will do after gaining access to a system, 
as this will ensure that the attack will remain undetected [1]. 
 
Rootkits also often open a backdoor through which the 
attacker can spy on the system’s activities [2]. The attacker 
can then proceed to capture personal data, such as bank 
account details, passwords, and credit card numbers. 
 
In this paper, we concentrate on rootkits that target the 
Windows XP operating system. We focus on this particular 
operating system for obvious reasons: the Windows family 
accounts for approximately 90% of the operating systems in 
use today and, within the Windows family, XP is by far the 
most popular [3]. 
 
There are clearly two very good reasons why it is 
important to conduct research in the area of Windows 
rootkits: 
 
1. It is estimated that 85% of malicious software is 
being written today with the intention of generating 
profit for the malware’s author [4]. We are no 
longer dealing with script kiddies just trying to 
create malware for fun, but instead are targeted by 
organized criminal gangs that want to steal money. 
The Symantec Corporation even claims that “cyber 
crime has surpassed illegal drug trafficking as a 
criminal moneymaker” [5]. 
2. There has been an increase of several hundred 
percent in both the number and complexity of 
rootkits over the last few years [6]. Malicious 
software is already a very big worldwide problem 
and the proliferation of rootkits is only going to 
serve to escalate this problem. 
These two trends are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
This paper discusses some of the rootkits that use 
hooking techniques to hide malware on a computer system. 
We explain how these rootkits were able to exploit the 
weaknesses of the Windows XP architecture. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Visibility of Malware versus Malicious Intent [13] 
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XP was released in 2001; Microsoft has recently released 
two other versions of Windows, namely Vista and 7. This 
paper also outlines the steps that Microsoft has taken in order 
to address the weaknesses of the XP architecture. In 
particular, we identify some of the anti-rootkit security 
features that Microsoft has unveiled in Vista and 7. 
 
We conclude the paper by suggesting that Microsoft 
should make better use of the available hardware memory 
protection mechanisms that are provided by Intel’s four 
protection modes (also known as rings) in order to reduce the 
incidence rate of rootkit infections in the future. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
 
• We describe how rootkits evolved in section II. 
• In sections III and IV, we explain some of the 
Windows XP rootkit hooking techniques and Intel’s 
ring architecture, respectively. 
• In section V, we assess some of the countermeasures 
that Microsoft has deployed in Vista and 7 to guard 
against rootkit attacks.  
• Finally, we provide a discussion of and conclusion to 
the paper in section VI. 
II. EVOLUTION OF ROOTKITS 
The Pakistani Brain, the first computer virus for the PC 
that appeared in 1986, is also considered to be the first type 
of malware that used stealth techniques to avoid detection. 
During the following year, in 1987, another virus called 
Lehigh was released into the wild. Lehigh, however, was not 
nearly as successful as the Pakistani Brain virus and was 
very quickly contained, primarily because it did not utilize 
stealth techniques to remain hidden. Having noticed the 
effectiveness of the Lehigh virus in comparison to the 
Pakistani Brain, virus writers thereafter realized the 
importance of making use of stealth techniques. [6] 
 
The first true rootkits started to appear in the early 1990s. 
During that period, malicious hackers often managed to 
penetrate computer systems and they would then use those 
compromised systems to launch attacks against other 
computers. To ensure that they would be able to take 
advantage of those compromised systems for an indefinite 
period of time, what they needed was a way to conceal their 
presence on the system. Thus, these hackers started 
developing rootkits for this purpose. [7]  
 
1997 marked a milestone in terms of rootkit technologies 
as it saw the release of Cabanas, the first virus developed for 
the Windows NT system. Cabanas is considered to be the 
forefather of many of the rootkits in the wild today that hook 
two API (Application Programming Interface) functions, 
namely FindFirstFile and FindNextFile, in order to hide 
some files in a folder [8]. On a Windows machine, files in a 
folder are stored in a linked list. In order to display the files, 
the FindFirstFile function is called to find the first file and 
the FindNextFile function is called to locate subsequent files. 
If these two functions have been hooked, it is then possible 
to ensure that certain files in the folder are never displayed 
and remain hidden. [15] 
A. Rootkits Grab the Headlines 
It was in 2005 that rootkits really grabbed the headlines 
with an incident involving Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 
the world’s second largest record label. Sony was concerned 
about users making illegal copies of their music files. Thus, 
they employed some stealth (rootkit) technologies on their 
music CDs that would hide digital rights management files 
and processes on a user’s computer. This would prevent 
users from making illegal copies of the music files on their 
computers. [17] 
 
This was achieved by using some code that would hide 
any file, folder or process that started with the string "$sys$" 
[19]. However, this meant that similarly named malware 
could, unfortunately, also be hidden from anti-virus scanners 
[17]. It was Mark Russinovich, a security expert, who had 
identified the rootkit and he subsequently made this 
knowledge public. 
 
When the two million customers who purchased these 
CDs found out that their machines had been compromised, 
they were outraged. After listening to lawfully purchased 
music on their computers, these individuals learned that 
some software had been installed on their machine without 
their permission. On top of that, Sony had failed to provide 
these customers with an uninstaller to completely remove 
this software. [18, 19]  
B. Attacks on Financial Institutions 
In recent years, rootkits have been successfully used in 
attacks on financial institutions. In January 2007, for 
example, a large Swedish bank was attacked using Haxdoor, 
a Trojan with rootkit capabilities. Phishing emails were first 
sent to the bank customers urging them to download and run 
an anti-spam application [9, 10, 11]. The application had the 
Haxdoor malware embedded in it. When installed on the 
victim’s system, the malware then proceeded to install a 
keylogger to capture keystrokes [12, 10]. This keylogger lay 
dormant on the user’s computer until the victim visited the 
bank’s website. This action triggered the keylogger to begin 
capturing keystrokes, and the stolen data was eventually sent 
to servers in Russia for further processing [12, 9, 10]. 
 
The Swedish bank reported that 250 customers had been 
attacked and a total of $1.17 million had been lost to the 
Russian organized criminals [12, 10, 11].  
 
This incident was successful for two reasons: 
 
• Firstly, the criminals managed to stay below the 
radar of security software by targeting a relatively 
small number of customers, by using a series of 
small withdrawals, and by spreading the attack over 
a period of 15 months [12, 11]. By staying below 
the radar in this way, the criminals made sure that 
no alarms were triggered. 
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• Secondly, the Haxdoor Trojan that was used in the 
attack contained a rootkit that ensured that the 
Trojan was not detected by the system. 
C. Proof-of-Concept Attacks on Smart Phones 
The latest news about rootkits involves a group of 
researchers at Rutgers University. In their research [20], they 
have been able to show that smart phones are just as 
vulnerable to rootkit attacks as desktop computers. The 
operating systems on these phones have evolved to the point 
that they are now almost as complex as those of PCs. 
Detecting and removing rootkits from desktop system has 
already proven to be a very challenging task, and the users of 
these smart phones are undoubtedly going to face similar 
challenges.  
 
The main concern about smart phones is that these 
devices can access a number of interfaces that are not 
available on regular desktop computers, such as GSM, GPS 
and the battery: 
 
1. The researchers at Rutgers demonstrated how 
rootkits could be used to listen in on private 
telephone conversations on a GSM network, and this 
could potentially lead to the leaking of sensitive 
information. 
2. Since most of these phones are equipped with GPS 
tracking capabilities, rootkits could also be use in an 
attack that aims to compromise the victim’s current 
location. 
3. Lastly, rootkits could be used in an attack to drain 
the phone’s battery and this would result in a denial 
of service for the user.  
III. HOOKING WINDOWS XP 
Having described how rootkits evolved in the previous 
section, we now explain how rootkits manage to hook the 
operating system. Hooking a Windows machine has several 
malicious purposes [24]: 
 
• By hooking the functions that list the files in a 
directory, a rootkit can ensure that certain files 
remain hidden on a system. 
• By hooking the appropriate functions in an antivirus 
program, a rootkit can guarantee that certain files are 
not scanned. 
• By hooking the functions involved in keyboard 
input, a rootkit would have the ability to capture 
keystrokes. 
• Hooking certain functions can cause a process to 
open a port on a system, thereby providing a 
backdoor for an attacker.  
Hiding files is the most common action taken by rootkits 
and we now give an example to illustrate how a rootkit 
created a hook in order to accomplish this on an XP system. 
Figure 2 describes one of the many hooks that had been 
created by the Feebs malware. Feebs is actually a worm with 
rootkit capabilities. It attempts to harvest information from 
an infected computer and send this stolen data to a remote 
user [25]. A machine can become infected when a user 
executes an email attachment containing this malware [23]. 
 
The hook in figure 2 is called an inline function hook [7]. 
These types of hooks are created when a rootkit overwrites 
the first five bytes of an API function with a JUMP 
instruction. The first byte in the function is replaced with the 
value E9, the opcode for a JUMP in assembly language, and 
the remaining four bytes contain a 32-bit address of some 
malicious code. Therefore, the process will jump to this 
address to execute malicious code whenever this API 
function is called. 
 
From figure 2, it is evident that the FindNextFileA API 
function in the Kernel32 DLL (Dynamic-Link Library) file 
had been hooked. As mentioned earlier, the Cabanas virus is 
considered to be the forefather of many of the rootkits in the 
wild today (such as Feebs) that hook this function in order to 
hide files. 
 
The FindNextFileA API function had been exported by 
the Kernel32 DLL file to the Ctfmon Windows process 
(Process IDentifier 1776 in figure 2). This process runs in the 
background on Windows XP systems: 
 
“Ctfmon.exe monitors the active windows and provides 
text input service support for speech recognition, 
handwriting recognition, keyboard, translation, and other 
alternative user input technologies [22].” 
 
Whenever this particular API function was called, some 
malicious code at address 10010822 was run. This code was 
contained within the mscf32 DLL file; Anson and Bunting 
[24] refer to such a file as a “rogue DLL” that an attacker had 
managed to inject into the memory address space of the 
Ctfmon process. Since this malicious code would be 
executed whenever the FindNextFileA function was called, 
the rootkit can ensure that certain files are never displayed. 
A. Windows XP Architectural Weaknesses 
It is possible to create a hook like that in figure 2 because 
there are some weaknesses in the Windows XP architecture 
that rootkits are able to take advantage of. In this subsection, 
we identify some of these weaknesses. 
 
Rootkits are capable of redirecting the flow of execution 
of an XP system. In the example given in figure 2, the rootkit 
had managed to overwrite the first five bytes of the 
FindNextFileA API function and then redirect the flow of 
execution to the mscf32 DLL file. How was this achieved? 
 
Most of the system DLL files are stored in the 
\Windows\System32\ directory. These critical files are 
protected by the Windows File Protection (WFP) feature 
[26]. This means that it is not possible to overwrite or replace 
these files, except in certain situations such as during a 
Windows update. This feature was incorporated in Windows 
2000 and XP to help improve the stability of these systems. 
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 McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 21-02-2010 at 01:52:57 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
   
=========================================== 
 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 1776 
Details: Export : Function  : 
  kernel32.dll!FindNextFileA => 
  C:\WINDOWS\system32\mscf32.dll:10010822 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\mscf32.dll 
Status: Hooked 
 
Figure 2.  Inline Function Hook Created by a Feebs Worm/Rootkit 
The necessary DLL files from the \Windows\System32\ 
folder are then copied into memory. These copies are marked 
as ‘read-only’ and all the processes have access to these 
shared files. If a particular process needs to modify one of 
these DLL files, a second copy of the file is created, while 
the other processes can still access the original DLL copy. 
This procedure is called Copy-on-Write: it protects processes 
from damaging each other while consuming as few resources 
as possible [27]. 
 
Rootkits exploit the fact that these DLL files can be 
overwritten in memory and are thus able to change the flow 
of execution. Even having modified the flow of execution, 
rootkits still need to perform one additional step: in the 
figure 2 example, the rootkit had managed to inject the 
mscf32 DLL file, containing some malicious code, into the 
Ctfmon process. The injection of this DLL file into the 
address space of the Ctfmon process could have been 
accomplished using, for instance, the LoadLibrary API 
function. 
 
In addition to this function, there are others (such as 
CreateRemoteThread and WriteProcessMemory) that make it 
trivial to inject malicious code into a running process. These 
functions transcend the normal barriers that have been put in 
place to protect processes from modifying each other. Sparks 
et al. [34] facetiously refer these functions as the “Rootkit 
API” that is provided by Windows since they simplify the 
job of a rootkit writer. 
B. Legitimate Uses of Hooking 
The next question that arises is: why does Microsoft allow 
this to occur? There are actually legitimate reasons for 
deploying hooks in a Windows machine. 
 
Way back in 1999, Microsoft provided a situation in 
which hooking the operating system would be a suitable 
option [33]. A company had created a DLL file that it would 
inject into a database product in order to enhance the 
capabilities of that product. When an attempt was made to 
terminate the product, a DLL_Process_Detach notification 
was sent, with the objective of unloading the DLL file from 
the address space of a certain process. The DLL would then 
proceed to close socket connections, files, and other 
resources. However, by the time the DLL file received the 
notification, other DLLs in the process’ address space would 
have already received their DLL_Process_Detach 
notifications. Thus, many functions that the DLL called 
would fail because the other DLLs had already been 
unloaded. 
 
Microsoft’s suggestion was to hook the ExitProcess API 
function. It is the ExitProcess function that ends the process 
and causes the system to send the DLL_Process_Detach 
notifications. If the ExitProcess function was hooked, it 
could be arranged so that the company’s DLL file would be 
the first one to be unloaded. The hook could then redirect the 
flow of execution back to the original ExitProcess function 
and the remaining DLLs could be unloaded without any 
concerns. 
 
Today, a lot of legitimate software, including several 
security packages such as antivirus and firewall applications, 
deploys hooks in the operating system to receive 
notifications about events like file creation and opening of 
ports [47]. Unfortunately, as we stated earlier, there are 
scores of rootkits that also exploit these techniques. 
IV. INTEL'S RING ARCHITECTURE 
In the previous section, we identified some of XP’s 
architectural flaws that rootkits could take advantage of. 
Another weakness of the Windows design relates to the 
hardware that this software runs on. Intel processors were 
created with four protection rings, as illustrated in figure 3. 
These rings could be used to help separate user applications, 
operating system services, device drivers and the operating 
system’s kernel. The inner rings have more privileges than 
the outer rings; in other words, the inner rings have full 
access to the outer rings and follow the principle of least 
privilege.  
 
On the other hand, there are special gates between the 
rings that control the access that an outer ring has to an inner 
ring. This helps improve security since an outer ring would 
not be able to gain access to an inner ring at will. For 
example, a user mode rootkit running in ring 3 would be 
prevented from turning on a web camera since the drivers for 
this hardware would only be accessible from ring 1 [37]. 
Furthermore, this design ensures that misbehaving 
applications, services or drivers will not disrupt the stability 
of the operating system’s kernel [28]. 
 
Even though Intel processors offered four distinct rings, 
the OS/2 operating system, which was initially created by 
Microsoft and IBM, made use of just three of these: ring 3 
for user applications and OS/2 services, ring 2 for device 
drivers, and ring 0 for the OS/2 kernel [38]. 
 
For the Windows family of operating systems, Microsoft 
reduced that number further and only made use of rings 3 
and 0: ring 3 was used for user applications while ring 0 was 
used for Windows services, device drivers and the Windows 
kernel. There were some concerns with this design; for 
example, there would be a need for driver signing (which we 
will elaborate on in the following section).  
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Figure 3.  Intel’s Ring Architecture [28, 37, 24, 14] 
 
Microsoft did provide a reason for this decision to only 
use two rings:  
 
 “Some hardware that was supported in the past (such as 
Compaq Alpha and Silicon Graphics MIPS) implemented 
only two privilege levels [28].” 
 
It is clear that Windows was first designed for a single-user 
PC without a network connection, and security features were 
not built in from the outset; Microsoft was more concerned 
about compatibility. Their strategy was to get their product to 
market as fast as possible and, given the success that they 
have had with Windows, you have to applaud them for that. 
The trouble was that rootkit writers began to take advantage 
of this architecture. With only two rings in use, there was no 
obstacle or barrier between the kernel space and user land. It 
was quite possible for rootkits to gain access to ring 0 and, 
once they did, they would then be able to take full control of 
the computer system. 
V. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH 
The Haxdoor Trojan that was used in the attack on the 
Swedish bank is typical of the malware that we can expect to 
witness more often in the future. In addition to its keylogging 
abilities, it also has screen capturing and form grabbing 
capabilities. These features will ensure that the malware will 
somehow manage to gather the personal data that it is after. 
Furthermore, its rootkit features are also proving that this 
strategy of quietly stealing information without raising any 
alarms is very effective.   
 
It is, therefore, logical to take the necessary steps to 
prevent infection of the system in the first place, and the best 
strategy to tackle such an attack-in-depth is to develop an 
effective defense-in-depth approach.  This was a term that 
was originally associated with a military tactic that tried to 
buy some time for soldiers when they came under attack. 
The defense-in-depth method, in terms of information 
security, uses multiple layers of security to ensure that 
confidential data is protected, even if the attackers manage to 
circumvent some of the layers.  
 
After enduring years of attacks on its operating systems, 
Microsoft has in recent years started to focus more on 
security and has invested considerable resources to protect its 
operating systems [16]. They have adopted a defense-in-
depth strategy to prevent rootkits from infecting their 
operating systems. Their multi-layered approach includes 
items such as:  
 
A. Kernel Patch Protection (KPP) 
B. Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address 
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
C. Driver Signing 
D. Windows Service Hardening 
While it might be possible to circumvent each individual 
defensive method, the cumulative effect of several layers of 
defenses will make the job of the attacker much more 
difficult. These defensive features are described in the 
following sections. 
A. Kernel Patch Protection (KPP) 
The kernel is the central component of the operating 
systems and can be considered to be a bridge between 
application programs and the hardware. This is illustrated in 
figure 4. Having such a key role to play in an operating 
system, Microsoft introduced Kernel Patch Protection (KPP), 
also known as Patchguard, to help protect the kernel and to 
improve the overall reliability, performance and security of 
Windows [31]. 
 
In particular, KPP can help prevent modifications of the 
System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT), which is often 
hooked by rootkits. For instance, figure 5 describes one of 
several SSDT hooks that had been created by Haxdoor, the 
Trojan/rootkit that was used in the attack on the Swedish 
bank. 
 
Figure 4.  Kernel of the Operating System [30] 
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 Native system services refer to undocumented API 
functions for the Windows operating system that are callable 
from user mode [28]. In figure 5, for example, 
ZwCreateProcess is an internal system service that the 
CreateProcess API function calls to create a new process. A 
native system service call is thus a mechanism that allows a 
user mode application to access the operating system’s 
kernel [8]. 
 
The SSDT contains a list of pointers with the addresses 
of the internal kernel function that implements the 
corresponding service [28, 8, 7]. A rootkit can intercept calls 
that are made to a specific native system service by replacing 
the SSDT entry with the address of its own code. After this 
rootkit code is executed, the original native system service 
can be called or some fabricated data can be returned instead 
[7, 29]. A graphical representation of the status of an SSDT 
hook is given in figure 6. 
 
Microsoft introduced KPP in 2005 and this consequently 
prevented rootkits from modifying any part of the kernel, 
such as the SSDT, the interrupt descriptor table (IDT), the 
global descriptor table (GDT), etc. [31]. Every five to ten 
minutes, KPP checks to confirm that these critical 
components of the kernel have not been modified. It does 
this by comparing against known good copies or signatures. 
If KPP determines that one of these components has been 
altered, it forces the system to crash. [39] 
 
KPP was only available for 64-bit versions of Windows, 
though, and there is a perfectly good reason for this. In 2005, 
32-bit versions of Windows were ubiquitous and, hence, 
there was an abundance of application programs available for 
these versions of Windows. Since Microsoft had not 
implemented any sort of KPP prior to 2005, many of the 
developers of these application programs took the liberty of 
hooking the kernel. This included products from several 
prominent security vendors, such as McAfee, Symantec and 
Kaspersky [32]. If Microsoft had employed KPP on 32-bit 
versions of Windows, these products that were hooking the 
kernel would have ceased functioning. This is not something 
that Microsoft would have wanted: they strongly encourage 
compatibility between their operating systems and third-
party application software. 
 
 
 
 
McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 16-11-2009 at 03:55:05 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
 
=========================================== 
 
Object-Type: SSDT-hook 
Object-Name: ZwCreateProcess 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\vdnt32.sys 
 
Figure 5.  SSDT Hook Created by a Haxdoor Trojan/Rootkit 
 
 
Figure 6.  Before and After an SSDT Hook is Implemented [29] 
On the other hand, a relatively small percentage of 64-bit 
versions of Windows were running in 2005. Thus, Microsoft 
took the step to implement KPP just on 64-bit versions as 
this would raise an insignificant number of compatibility 
issues. As a final point, to appease vendors such as McAfee, 
Symantec and Kaspersky, Microsoft created additional APIs 
to ensure that these companies would still be able to develop 
64-bit versions of their products without having to hook the 
kernel. 
 
We conclude that this is an indication that Microsoft has 
definitely started taking security very seriously with the 
development of KPP. When it comes to protesting the kernel, 
Microsoft has, in essence, given up on 32-bit versions of its 
operating systems. Nevertheless, the software giant has taken 
a strong stance to ensure that the 64-bit kernel will be 
protected. Not only will a 64-bit machine be able to 
accommodate significantly more RAM, users of these 
systems can rest assured that they will be provided with 
increased security as well. 
B. Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space 
Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
Prior to deploying a rootkit in a computer system, the 
attacker must gain access to that system. Often, attackers 
manage to exploit the software on the system by using buffer 
overflows [7]. In response to these attacks, Microsoft has 
recently introduced two defensive techniques: Data 
Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout 
Randomization (ASLR). We first briefly explain how buffer 
SSDT
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overflow attacks work and then describe the two 
countermeasures. 
 
1) Buffer Overflows 
 
Basically, attackers who make use of buffer overflows 
take advantage of the fact that most high-level language 
programmers do not fully understand what is occurring at the 
assembly level. Suppose, for example, a program has been 
designed to request some type of input and this information 
is stored on the stack in a buffer of maximum size 100. To 
cause the buffer to overflow, the attacker could possibly send 
1000 characters, with the remaining 900 characters 
overwriting the adjacent memory on the stack. [35] 
 
A well-designed buffer overflow attack would ensure that 
the 900 excess characters, in this case, contained some 
malicious rootkit code that would be stored on memory. 
Once this code has been executed, the attacker would be able 
to take control of the system. [36] 
 
It should be pointed out that Linux- and Unix-based 
operating systems are susceptible to these types of attacks as 
well. The telnet daemon (telnetd), for instance, which allows 
users to remotely log in to a machine, was found to contain a 
vulnerability that would allow an attacker to trigger a buffer 
overflow and cause a denial of service (DoS) or possibly 
execute malicious code [50]. 
 
2) DEP and ASLR Countermeasures 
 
Windows machines that have enabled DEP, which is also 
referred to as eXecute Disable (XD) by Intel and No eXecute 
(NX) by AMD, are less vulnerable to buffer overflow 
attacks. DEP first identifies which memory locations in a 
process contain data and which contain code. After this has 
been established, DEP can then block the execution of any 
code in the data content area [16]. Thus, an attacker might, 
for instance, endeavor to use a buffer overflow exploit to 
inject some malicious code and overwrite data on the stack. 
If an attempt is then made to execute that code, DEP 
immediately triggers an alarm and the program is terminated. 
[40] 
 
ASLR also helps prevent buffer overflow attacks. With 
ASLR, modules are loaded into random locations whenever 
a system boots and this makes it difficult for shellcode to 
operate successfully [42, 39]. Suppose, for example, an 
attacker had managed to introduce some malicious code onto 
the stack. Next, suppose that this code then attempts to inject 
a rogue DLL into a process by calling the LoadLibrary API 
function in the Kernel32 DLL file. The location of the 
LoadLibrary function would need to be determined. This 
task would be more complicated with ASLR because the 
Kernel32 DLL file might have been loaded into any one of 
256 different locations.  
 
A security expert from Microsoft demonstrated how 
ASLR works [41]. He first determined the location of several 
DLL files on his laptop: 
 
 
 
• wsock32.dll   0x73ad0000 
• winhttp.dll   0x74020000 
• user32.dll 0x779b0000 
• kernel32.dll   0x77c10000 
• gdi32.dll   0x77a50000 
After rebooting his machine, he then found that, because of 
ASLR, those same DLLs had moved to the following 
locations: 
 
• wsock32.dll   0x73200000 
• winhttp.dll   0x73760000 
• user32.dll   0x770f0000 
• kernel32.dll   0x77350000 
• gdi32.dll   0x77190000 
DEP and ASLR are most effective when they are used 
together [39, 42]. If DEP is used without ASLR, the code 
that has been injected onto the stack could be used to redirect 
the flow of execution to a known function address. 
Conversely, if ASLR is used without DEP, the attacker could 
simply execute code off the stack. 
C. Driver Signing 
As noted earlier, the Windows family of operating 
systems only uses two of the four protection rings offered by 
the processor. Intel had originally anticipated that device 
drivers would operate in ring 1 but, because ring 1 is not 
used in Windows machines, these drivers execute instead in 
ring 0. This means that they have full access to the computer 
system, and this raises some concerns. The driver might 
possibly contain some malicious code, such as a rootkit, that 
could be used to take control of the machine. 
 
This vulnerability was one of the reasons that Microsoft 
introduced a driver signing mechanism, where the computer 
user would be warned whenever an attempt was made to 
install an unauthorized driver [28]. 
D. Windows Service Hardening 
Windows services refer to programs that run quietly in 
the background on a Windows machine [28, 24]. As 
mentioned previously, these services, device drivers and the 
kernel all operate in ring 0, and this causes some concerns. If 
a rootkit manages to grab control of one of these services, it 
could execute with unrestricted privileges and take over the 
whole computer system [14]. Another reason that these 
services are attractive to rootkit writers is that they are 
normally running from the time the machine boots up until it 
shuts down [43]. 
 
Thus, Microsoft introduced Windows service hardening 
to restrict the privileges that were available to these services, 
thereby removing any privileges that each service did not 
require. Furthermore, there were procedures put into place to 
ensure that the services were isolated from each other, 
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consequently protecting each of these services from the other 
services and applications. [43] 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has outlined some of the anti-rootkit features 
that Microsoft has introduced in the last few years: Kernel 
Patch Protection, Data Execution Prevention, Address Space 
Layout Randomization, Driver Signing, Windows Service 
Hardening, etc. Essentially, Microsoft has had to resort to 
these measures because of the decision that they took to 
make use of only two of the four protection rings that were 
available on the processor: 
 
• If the kernel had been isolated in ring 0, there might 
not have been any need for implementing Kernel 
Patch Protection. 
• If device drivers had been installed in ring 1 as Intel 
had planned, there might not have been any need 
for requiring Driver Signing. 
• If Windows services had been executing in ring 2 as 
Intel had intended, there might not have been any 
need for employing Windows Service Hardening. 
Was it then a good decision for Microsoft to use just two 
of the four protection rings? There is no question that 
because Microsoft made this decision, their operating 
systems are not as secure as they could have been. On the 
other hand, because Microsoft was concerned about 
compatibility from the very beginning, they now have 90% 
of the operating systems market share, and you can’t really 
argue with those results. 
 
So, where does Microsoft go from here? We feel that this 
is the time for Microsoft to completely redesign their 
Windows operating system and adopt a four-ring architecture 
as Intel had originally proposed. We conclude this paper by 
providing some justification for making this statement: 
 
• Microsoft needs to take back control of the kernel. 
Having device drivers and Windows services also 
operating in ring 0 should not be permissible. Ring 
0 needs to be reserved exclusively for the kernel. 
Because Microsoft does not have full control of the 
kernel, they have had to resort to deploying 
strategies such as Kernel Patch Protection. These 
short term solutions do not address the real 
problem. In fact, Authentium and Uniformed [44, 
45] have already demonstrated that it is possible to 
circumvent Kernel Patch Protection. 
 
• Microsoft is a well established company with a 
strong brand name and an abundance of resources 
available to them. They could invest some of these 
resources into developing a new version of 
Windows, based on a four-ring architecture, from 
scratch. The demand is there for a top quality 
product. 
• Microsoft is facing some formidable competition in 
Google. Google is definitely more than just a search 
engine, offering products and services such as 
Gmail, Google Docs, YouTube and Google Maps. 
Most importantly, Google is about to unveil a brand 
new operating system that, unlike Windows, has 
been designed from the ground up with security in 
mind [46]. 
Google’s new operating system will also appeal to 
financial institutions, such as the Swedish bank and 
its 250 customers that were attacked. One of 
Google’s guiding principles is, “Don’t scapegoat 
the users” [46]. The burden of ensuring that the 
computer system is secure should not be the 
responsibility of the bank’s customers and they 
should not be held accountable when attacked. In 
fact, David Shroyer, vice president of online 
security and enrollment at Bank of America, goes 
on to point out that “customer education is less 
powerful of a weapon against stealthy malware that 
is constantly finding ways to avoid detection” [48].  
 
Google has already entered the smartphone market 
and, if the statistics in table 1 are anything to go by, 
Microsoft needs to take note and should be 
concerned about the impending release of Google’s 
desktop operating system. In the three-month period 
from the end of November 2009 until the end of 
February 2010, Google increased their market share 
of smartphone operating systems by 5.2 points, in 
large part at the expense of Microsoft. 
 
Security is certainly a very high priority for 
computer users today and Microsoft does not have a 
very good reputation when it comes to security. If 
these users are not satisfied with the security that is 
being provided by Windows and if Google offers a 
better (and cheaper) alternative, they will surely 
make the switch. 
 
Table 1: Top Smartphone Platforms in the US [49] 
 Share (%) of Smartphone Subscribers 
Three Month 
Avg. Ending 
Nov. 2009 
Three Month 
Avg. Ending 
Feb. 2010 
Point 
Change 
RIM 40.8% 42.1% 1.3 
Apple 25.5% 25.4% -0.1 
Microsoft 19.1% 15.1% -4.0 
Google 3.8% 9.0% 5.2 
Palm 7.2% 5.4% -1.8 
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